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THIN ICE, SHIFTING GEOPOLITICS: THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
ARCTIC ICE MELT
Tessa Mendez*
INTRODUCTION

Navigators searched for a commercial sea route via the Arctic Sea for
centuries. In North America, this route was historically known as the Northwest
Passage, and generations of merchants and seamen sought the route because the
existence of such a passage would dramatically cut travel time and costs.1 Heavy
ice in the Arctic Ocean once prevented utilization of both the Northwest Passage
over the American continent and the Northern Sea Route over the Eurasian
continent. Today, this may be changing. Arctic ice naturally recedes every
summer when the region is exposed to long hours of sunlight, and the melting in
recent years has been considerably greater than historical averages. Due to rising
global temperatures, scientists project that the Arctic sea routes will open up to
seasonal shipping within the century.2
The melting ice will also facilitate access to the Arctic's lucrative natural
resources. Not only does the Arctic seabed have rich mineral deposits, but
geologists also believe large quantities of oil and natural gas lie beneath the Arctic
seabed. 3 As one expert has aptly noted, "[i]ronically, the great melt is likely to
yield more of the very commodities that precipitated it: fossil fuels." 4 The growing
pressure to discover diminishing supplies of oil and natural gas will likely entice
oil and gas companies to extract the resources that are predicted lie under the
Arctic sea.
Due to the hostility of the region, the Arctic expanse has been largely ignored
or forgotten throughout modem history. Because Arctic sovereignty has never
been completely determined or agreed upon, rights to the opening Arctic
passageways as well as the natural resources located under the water are sure to be
* University of Denver Sturm College of Law, J.D. expected 2011; Editor in Chief of the Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy 2010-2011. This paper was the winning submission in the 2009
Leonard V. B. Sutton international law writing competition. As part of the award, the author was
presented with a scholarship to attend the Hague Academy of International Law in the Netherlands
during the summer of 2010. I would like to thank Professor Nanda for leading our international law
program with unpretentious good humor. Additionally, I would like to thank my parents, friends, and
the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy who made this note possible.
1. Clifford Krauss, Steven L. Myers, Andrew C. Revkin & Simon Romero, As PolarIce Turns to
Water, Dreams of TreasureAbound, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at Al.
2. Mark Jarashow, Michael B. Runnels, & Tait Svenson, Note, UNCLOS and the Arctic: the
Path ofLeast Resistance, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1587, 1587 (2007).
3. Scramblefor the Seabed, THE EcONOMIST, Jan. 3, 2009.
4. Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global
Warming, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63 (2008).

527

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

528

VOL. 3 8:3

contested in years to come.5 As a consequence, questions regarding the delineation
of territorial sovereignty that are largely settled in other areas of the world remain
contested in the Arctic. As states realize the value of the Arctic, they start to assert
and enforce their privileged claims of dominion. Within the last few years, the
international struggle for control of the Arctic's natural resources, navigational
capacity, and military opportunities have dramatically increased.6
International law has a vital role to play in resolving the unfolding dispute.
The provisions and definitions within the United Nations Convention on the Law
of Sea 7 ("UNCLOS" or "the Convention") provide critical guidance for Arctic
nations as they attempt to assert sovereignty claims. UNCLOS also establishes
dispute resolution mechanisms that could be used to determine ownership of Arctic
territory if countries cannot negotiate acceptable decisions. Moreover, although
not yet ratified by the United States, this Convention is largely seen as a
codification of customary international law. Therefore, UNCLOS should be
regarded as a primary resource for resolution of Arctic disagreements.
Sovereignty disputes reflect the geopolitical realities of the region.
Geopolitics is defined as the study of the influence of geography, history, and
social science with reference to spatial politics and patterns at various scales.8 The
geopolitical balance of power in the Arctic is radically changing as the geography
of the region undergoes massive transformation. Arctic geography has increasing
economic and strategic significance because the resources in the area are becoming
commercially available. Geopolitics, because it is preoccupied with borders,
resources, flows, territories, and identities, can provide a pathway for critical
analysis of future disputes.? Moreover, the interrelationship between power and
geography can be used as a tool to understand and anticipated trends in the
international law of the region. The changes in the Arctic have created a unique
situation, and the analysis that follows will provide an in-depth review of the
various legal claims.
This paper is divided into six parts. Part I gives background information
about how fast the ice is melting. The pace of the melt is important because visible
signs of warming pressures countries to assert claims on resources and navigable
regions. Part II highlights the importance of northern sea routes and is followed by
Part III outlining the mineral wealth in the region. Because mining and travel in
the Arctic will be both expensive and hazardous even after significant portions of
sea ice have melted, states seek to understand the dangers of the region to better
appreciate the costs and benefits of development. Part IV analyzes the law of
continental shelves and how countries are already utilizing this law to claim the sea
floor. Part V examines the laws that could affect the Northwest Passage and the
5. See Stephanie Holmes, Comment, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic
Sovereignty, 9 CI. J. INT'L L. 323, 324 (2008).
6. Scramblefor the Seabed, supranote 3.
7. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
8. GEAROID

9. Id.

6 TAUTHAIL, CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS 10

(1996).
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international use of the Arctic ocean over North America. Part VI concludes by
outlining potential resolutions to the Arctic dispute and projections about the
future.

I. How QUICKLY Is ARCTIC ICE MELTING?
Global warming is most dramatic in the Arctic. 10 In Alaska and western
Canada, average winter temperatures have increased by as much as seven degrees
Fahrenheit in the past 60 years." Scientists agree that atmospheric warming will
continue for years to come, and that this warming will significantly affect ice
coverage in the Arctic. Many experts believe the particularly sharp increase in
warming and melting throughout the last few decades can be attributed to both

human and natural causes.12 Because ice and snow are white, they have what is
known as a "high albedo" and reflect most solar energy.13 Albedo is a measure of
how strongly an object reflects light from sources such as the sun. Water is darker
and thus has a "low albedo" that absorbs most solar radiation. This creates a
condition known as a "positive feedback loop" and, as a consequence, the Arctic
region essentially amplifies any sort of warming trend. 14 The ocean exposed by
melting ice soaks up more heat, which melts more ice and exposes more sea.15 In
the most extreme scenario, the positive feedback loop could cause extreme
deterioration of Arctic sea ice, leaving the Arctic Ocean more like the Baltic Sea,
covered by only a thin layer of seasonal ice in the winter. 16 At the current pace of
retreat, trans-Arctic voyages could be possible within the next five to ten years, but
it remains extremely difficult to make an accurate prediction. 17
Arctic ice is melting at a much faster rate than scientists originally projected.
According to satellite images from the European Space Agency, the year 2007
showed the lowest Arctic sea ice levels on record.18 The ice was so sparse that, for
the first time in recorded history, the Northwest Passage was fully clear of ice. 19
While the Northern Sea Route, a similar sea passage over the Siberian coast,
remained blocked by a large mass of ice, the Northern Sea Route is predicted to
open at approximately the same time as the Northwest Passage. 20 Experts at the
National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) in Boulder, Colorado, noted that this
significant transformation in Arctic geography occurred 30 years ahead of what

10. Borgerson, supra note 4.
11. Id.
12. Andrew Revkin, No Escape: Thaw Gains Momentum, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at Fl.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Borgerson, supra note 4.
18. John Roach, Arctic Melt Opens up Northwest Passage,NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Sept.
17, 2007,
available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/09/070917-northwestpassage.html.
19. Id.
20. Press Release, National Snow and Ice Data Center, Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous
Record Lows (Oct. 1 2007) available at http://www.nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum
/20071001_pressrelease.html.
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had been predicted.2 1 Scientists are exploring several theories that may explain the
mismatch between observations and climate models. The models may have
assumed sea ice levels to be thicker than they actually are, they may lack a key
dynamic in ocean circulation patterns, or they may underestimate the effects of the
feedback loop. 22
Anthropogenic climate change will continue to affect the geography of the
Arctic. Because geography shapes political power, the human struggle over
borders, space, and authority in the Arctic will only increase in years to come.23
As the physical landscape of the Arctic shifts, the landscape of human control
shifts too. Not surprisingly, Arctic countries are scrambling to exert control over
this potentially critical region.
II. WHY Do NORTHERN SEA ROUTES MATTER?

Northern sea routes provide economic, strategic, and political advantages.
This section will analyze how an ice free Arctic tempts international shippers and
traders with the promise of large cost reductions. It will also examine some of the
concerns associated with shipping in this delicate and dangerous region. The
Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage could assist international trade by
cutting existing transit times by days, and would save shipping companies
thousands of miles in travel.24 The current route from Rotterdam and Yokohama
through the Suez Canal stretches 11,200 nautical miles. 25 The Northern Sea Route
could reduce the sailing distance to only 6,500 nautical miles, saving more than 40
percent.26 Likewise, the Northwest Passage could cut a voyage from Seattle to
Rotterdam by 2,000 nautical miles, making it nearly 25 percent shorter than the
current route, through the Panama Canal.27
International business would also be profoundly affected by Arctic ice melt.
Taking into account canal fees, fuel costs, and other variables that determine
freight rates, the shortcuts over the top of the world could cut the cost of a single
voyage of a large container ship by as much as 20 percent, from approximately
$17.5 million to $14 million. 28 The savings would be even greater for the
megaships that cannot fit through the Panama and Suez Canals and must currently
29
sail around the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn.
Moreover, these Arctic
routes would also allow commercial and military vessels to avoid sailing through
politically unstable Middle Eastern waters and the pirate plagued waters off the
coast of Somalia and in the South China Sea.30

21. Roach, supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. 0 TAUTHAIL, supranote 8, at 10.
24. Borgerson, supra note 4.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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These advantages have led many leaders and intellectuals to reconsider the
value of the Arctic; an inherently geopolitical process. Geopoliticians argue that
the world is actively 'spacialized,' divided up, labeled, and sorted out into a
hierarchy of places of greater and lesser importance.31 States then express their
sovereignty by enforcing property rights over the areas of importance. As Arctic
countries increasingly understand the significance of the northern reaches, they
become anxious to possess them.
Arctic interest is somewhat tempered, however, by the significant drawbacks
of Northern Sea routes. Not only will the Arctic remain covered in ice throughout
the winter, but thick, multi-year ice will remain prevalent for some time to come.32
As opposed to first-year ice that is usually 3 feet thick and formed over a single
winter, multi-year ice can be over 16 feet thick and sharp enough to cut through the
hull of a ship. 33 Models have shown that the melting of first-year ice will annually
open the Northwest Passage, but the melt may also clear the way for large pieces
of multi-year ice to drift down from the North Canadian Archipelago.34 This
multi-year ice can be exceptionally dangerous. One study showed that multi-year
ice accounted for 74 percent of the damage suffered by ships traveling in the
Canadian Arctic between 1976 and 2007.35 Therefore, if shippers ever attempt to
take advantage of the passages, they will have to employ significant precautions.
In order to navigate these dangerous, opening sea-lanes, many of the world's
shipyards are building ships with fortified hulls.36 The lure of the Northern Sea
Route and Northwest Passage are driving the development and construction of new
types of ships, such as a double-ended tanker that can cruise bow first through
open water and then tum around and proceed stem first to break through ice. 7
Russia has already acquired fourteen ice-breakers for its fleet, and many American
naval specialists now say the two ice-breakers currently owned by the United
States are grossly inadequate. 38 The very act of purchasing ice-breakers reveals
interest in the region, and demonstrates future intentions.
III. WHAT ARE THE PROJECTED NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE ARCTIC?

Open and accessible sea lanes are not the only valuable commodity that an
ice-free Arctic Ocean offers. This part of the paper will analyze the natural
resources of the Arctic. Importantly, the technology and infrastructure needed to
utilize these resources has not yet been developed. Nevertheless, these resources

31. JOHN AGNEW, GEOPOLITICS: RE-VISIONING WORLD POLITICS 2-3 (2d ed. 2003) (1998).

32. See Peter Tyson, Future of the Passage, NOVA, Feb. 2006, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh
/nova/arctic/passage.html.
33. Anne Casselman, Will the Opening of the Northwest Passage Transform Global Shipping
Anytime Soon?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Nov. 10, 2008, available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm
?id=opening-of-northwest-passage.

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Krauss et al., supranote 1.
37. Id.

38. Andrew Revkin, Experts Urge U.S. to IncreaseIcebreakerFleet in Arctic Waters, N.Y. TIMES
Aug. 17, 2008 at AO.
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have generated the most excitement about the Arctic, and may generate future
conflict. The Arctic may be the next, and probably the last, great energy frontier.39
Scientists estimate the resources in the Arctic account for about 22 percent of the
undiscovered, technically recoverable hydrocarbon resources in the world.40
Typically, "undiscovered" resources are those which have not been measured or
even fully identified, but are marked by some degree of geological assurance.41
"Technically recoverable resources" are those resources producible using currently
42
available technology and industry practices.
Scientists in the American
government believe that 90 billion barrels of oil and vast amounts of natural gas
may lie beneath the Arctic Ocean.43 This quantity of oil would sufficiently the
meet current world demand for approximately three years.44 With such huge
potential profits at stake, the race has begun among Arctic nations for control of
the resources in areas once considered too harsh to explore. As fuel prices become
extremely volatile, the possibility of oil and natural gas reserves in the Arctic takes
on added geopolitical significance. Because politically unstable Middle Easter
countries currently possessed the majority of fuel resources, Arctic nations may
fight to possess oil and natural gas in the region and achieve energy independence.
While scientists begin to gain a better understanding of the resources in the
Arctic, the exact locations of those resources remain relatively unknown. About
84 percent of the estimated resources are expected to be offshore. 45 A third of the
undiscovered oil, or about 30 billion barrels, is believed to be off the coast of
Alaska while nearly two-thirds of the undiscovered natural gas resources are in two
Russian provinces, the West Siberian Basin and the East Barents Basin.46 Many
countries - including the United States - have scrambled to launch geological
survey missions to better understand and assert their claims.47 The imprecise
boundaries in the Arctic have made the ownership of off-shore Arctic resources
ambiguous. If the majority of the Arctic oil and natural gas can be found in
territorial waters, long-term conflict is less likely to occur. At this point, however,
the lack of certainty and the huge economic potential of the oil and gas reserves
add to tensions between Arctic nations.
Oil and natural gas are not the only resources likely to be found in the Arctic
- valuable minerals may also exist on the seabed. Scientists have long known
about unconventional mineral ore deposits known as manganese nodules. These
nodules are spherical accretions of manganese, cobalt, copper and nickel which

39. Krauss et al., supranote 1.
40. Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet
of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic (Jul. 23, 2008), available at http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/
article.asp?ID= 1980&from-rsshome.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Scramblefor the Seabed, supra note 3.
44. Jad Mouawad, Oil Survey Says Arctic has Riches, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 24, 2008, at CO.
45. U.S. Geological Survey, supranote 40.
46. Mouawad, supranote 44.
47. U.S. Geological Survey, supranote 40.
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precipitate out of sea water at depth.48 They form when warm solutions of
dissolved metals from the earth's crust leach into cold ocean waters, and they are
found on roughly a quarter of the ocean floor. 49 Recovering the nodules can be
technically difficult. The nodules are usually found under at least 2 miles of water
and dredging them stirs large quantities of sediment which seriously disrupts
marine habitat.5 0
Thus, excitement surrounding the minerals has calmed
significantly since the 1970's.51 Not only must the technology become cheaper
and more widely available, but industrial commodity prices must also remain high
to make manganese nodules profitable.52
Because the Arctic can be relatively unstable and much remains unknown
about specific conditions, environmental issues surround all forms of resource
extraction in the region. Concerns about onshore resources, such as the oil in
Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, have dominated debates about Arctic
development in the United States up to this point.53 However, in the future most
resources will likely be discovered offshore. Arctic development will surely create
environmental consequences. The United States Coast Guard has already begun to
prepare for the time when tanker and other ship traffic increases in the area, taking
precautionary steps to deal with an inevitable oil spill. 54 Russia, on the other hand,
has taken very few steps to prevent and manage oil spills. For the entire Barents
region, Russia has only two bases with the equipment necessary to fight an oil spill
while Norway has at least 50 bases of this kind. 5 Any oil spill occurring in the
Arctic will take longer to dissipate because the waves are not as strong in the
region and natural decomposition occurs slowly in colder temperatures. 56
Therefore, even as countries look to the Arctic to supplement declining oil
reserves, environmental security may become an issue that divides countries as
well.
Geopolitics is inherently tied to resource use and control. The Arctic, as
relatively virgin territory, lacks the geopolitical stability that has been established
in most other areas of the world. The fact that the geography itself is in flux adds
to the instability of the region. Countries will jockey for position until an effective
legal regime is established in the area.
IV. WHAT

Is THE

LAW OF CONTINENTAL SHELVES?

As global pressures on resources inevitably increase, contested Arctic
sovereignty claims beg resolution. International law of the sea will be an essential
tool in resolving debates. This section begins with a brief history of maritime law,
48. Scramblefor the Seabed, supra note 3.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Borgerson, supra note 4.
54. Andrew Revkin A Little Oil Goes a Long Way, Dot Earth Blog, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25, 2008,
http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/25/a-little-oil-goes-a-long-way/?apage=9.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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followed by an examination of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, and how the Commission of Continental Shelves may be the body used to
determine resource rights.
These analyses reveal the importance of the
Commission of Continental Shelves and UNCLOS, and suggest that it is
imperative for the United States to ratify this treaty to protect its national interests.
A. HistoricMaritime Law
In 1608, Hugo Grotius published a short treatise arguing that the world's
oceans constitute a common resource belonging to all states.
This proposition
became known as the Freedom of the Seas Doctrine and still forms the basis of
modem maritime law." Grotius supported his argument with the premise that the
ocean was so large and inexhaustible that rival countries could simultaneously
carry out the major activities of fishing and navigation without incident.5 9
Unfortunately, Grotius' premise did not hold true post-industrialization, and the
world's oceans have become vulnerable to overuse. 60 The high seas have become
subject to the tragedy of the commons.61 In this context, the tragedy of the
commons is represented by multiple states acting independently and ultimately
spoiling large portions of the ocean through over-fishing, resource exploitation,
and pollution. 62 The Arctic region, with its fragile environment, seems particularly
susceptible to the tragedy of the commons, especially if sovereignty rights remain
unresolved.
International law of the sea evolved dramatically throughout the twentieth
century as technology developed and the problems associated with overuse
expanded. Historically, nations could only exert rights over the ocean for three
nautical miles (nm) beyond their geographic territory, but this standard began to
shift in the beginning of the twentieth century as countries sought to extend their
territories to include mineral deposits and fishing rights. In 1945, President
Truman extended the United States' control to all resources on the continental
shelf using the customary international law principle of resource protection.63 Also
in the latter part of the 1940's, several countries extended their control to 200 nm
beyond their land territory to cover productive fishing grounds.64 Both the 200
nautical mile boundary and continental shelf sovereignty have become part of
modem law.65

57. Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberian (Ralph Van Deman, trans., Oxford 2001) (1916).
58. Rebecca Bratspies, Finessing King Neptune: Fisheries Management and the Limits of
InternationalLaw, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 213, 219 (2001).
59. Id.
60. Id. at216-17.
61. See Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243 (1968).
62. Id.
63. Policy of the United States With Respect to the NaturalResources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed
of the ContinentalShelf Proclamation No. 2667 (Sept 28, 1945), reprinted in 1945 Pub. Papers 150,
150 (nullified by the Outer Continental ShelfLand Acts, 43 USC § 1331 et. seq. (2000)).
64. Bratspies, supranote 58, at 222.
65. See UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 57, 76.
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Toward the latter half of the twentieth century, resources heavily contested,
and thus nautical disagreements, became more frequent. There was a general call
for the codification of international maritime law, so negotiations began on the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1973. The Convention was
designed to resolve international nautical disputes 66 and to set aside the resources
of the high seas as the common heritage of mankind.67 UNCLOS is sometimes
considered the "constitution of the oceans," due to its expansive nature. 68
UNCLOS governs nearly every aspect of maritime law, including sovereignty
limits, navigation, seabed mining, and environmental protection.69 Moreover it
provides a legal framework for resolving ocean-related disputes, which may make
it an appropriate organization to deal with the Arctic conflict. While the United
States has not yet ratified UNCLOS, it has become generally accepted worldwide
and recognized as a codification of customary international law. To understand
how UNCLOS may apply to the Arctic, the following provides a brief description
of the terminology and access rights associated with coastal zones described in
UNCLOS.
B. UNCLOS and ContinentalShelves
Despite the United States' non-ratification, the expansive nature of UNCLOS
and its general acceptance make this treaty a prime candidate for adjudicating
sovereign claims and natural resource disputes in the Arctic. UNCLOS creates a
general structure of maritime control for coastal states all over the world.
UNCLOS codified customary international law by granting states the most control
over the waters closest to its shore or "baseline."7 0 A state can exercise less
control over areas found further from its land territory. In general, a state can
exercise its sovereignty 200 nm from its baseline.
This area is known as the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the coastal nation has sole exploitation rights
over all natural resources within that boundary - including oil and natural gas
reserves.72 UNCLOS allows states to extend their exclusive economic zone
beyond 200 nm only if they can demonstrate that the continental shelf beyond their
coastline extends further.73
UNCLOS defines the continental shelf as the natural prolongation of the land
territory to the continental margin's outer edge.74 So long as the shelf extends at
least 100nm from the point at which the sea reaches a depth of 2.5km - known as
the 2500 meter isobath - a country may be granted rights over the natural resources

66. Id. at Preamble.
67. Id. art. 150.
68. UNCLOS is often commonly referred to as the "constitution of the oceans." See e.g., John T.
Swing, What Futurefor the Oceans?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS Sept. 2003 at 139.
69. See UNCLOS, supra note 7.
70. See discussion of internal waters and the Northwest Passage, infra.
71. UNCLOS, supranote 7, arts. 56, 57.
72. Id.
73. Id. arts. 76, 77.
74. Id.art. 76.
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on and under the seabed up to 350 nautical miles from land. 5 This provision
allows coastal states to extract oil and natural gas on the continental shelves, to the
exclusion of others.
Because it can be difficult to decipher the geologic structures of the
continental shelf, UNCLOS created a specific body to examine claims. This body,
known as the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
meets every two years.76 While this Commission may provide specific proposals
to the countries that submit claims, UNCLOS describes the role of the Commission
of the Continental Shelf as 'recommendatory' only.
Coastal states have the
liberty to establish their boundaries on the basis of the Commission's
suggestions. 8 Countries have ten years to submit claims to the body after
ratification of UNCLOS. 7 9 Five countries have territory within the Arctic Circle:
the United States (via Alaska), Russia, Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), and
Norway. The U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, and so has not yet established a ten
year deadline. Russia ratified the Convention in 1997, making 2009 the last
session during which it could bring claims.o Canada ratified UNCLOS in 2003
and Denmark in 2004, so both of these countries have some years before they must
submit their final claims. Norway ratified the Convention in 1996, and submitted
a claim to the Commission on Continental Shelves in 2006.82
The Commission on Continental Shelves has already reviewed Norway's
submission and in 2009, the Commission approved Norway's 146,000 square mile
claim.83 One small section, known as the Loophole, overlaps with a previous
Russian claim.84 When the Commission approved Norway's claim, it stated that it
was up to Norway to resolve any disputed areas through negotiation.
Because
the United States has not ratified the UNCLOS, it cannot bring claims before the
commission and no representatives sit on the advisory board.
Russia has aggressively asserted its sovereignty in the region since its
ratification of UNCLOS in 1997. In 2001, Russia was the first Arctic nation to
bring a submission before the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf.86 In this claim, Russia sought ownership of approximately 460,000 square
miles of the continental shelf; an area roughly the size of the states of California,
75. Id.
76. Id. Annex II.
77. Id.
78. See David A. Colson, The Delimitationof the Outer Continental Shelf Between Neighboring
States, 97 A.J.I.L. 91, 93 (2003).
79. UNCLOS, supranote 7, at Annex art. 4.
80. Holmes, supranote 5, at 331.
8 1. Id.
82. UN Backs Norway claim to Arctic Seabed Extension, CALGARY HERALD, Apr. 15, 2009,
available at http://www.calgaryherald.com/technology/backs+Norway+claim+Arctic+seabed+exten
sion/1499675/story.html.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Borgerson, supra note 4.
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Indiana, and Texas combined.8 7 This 2001 claim included the North Pole.8 8 The
UN Commission neither rejected nor accepted the Russian proposal, but
recommended the country undertake additional research.89
In the summer of 2007, Russia sent a team of scientists in one of its nuclear
powered ice-breakers to survey the Arctic region and plant the Russian flag on the
seabed beneath the North Pole. 90 While the submersible was planting the flag, it
also took samples from the sea floor. 91 From these geologic samples, Russia
argued the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain ridge that runs underneath
the North Pole, and the Mendeleev Ridge, were natural extensions of the Eurasian
continent.92
Russia submitted these findings to the UN Commission on
Continental Shelves in May of 2009.93
What did Russia argue in its submission to the Commission? Under the
Convention, a state must demonstrate that an underwater structure is a geologic
extension of the land territory. Thus, Russia would have to establish that the
Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges were not "oceanic ridges," defined in the
Convention as free-standing geologic structures separated from the continental
shelf.94 Therefore, Russia would have to demonstrate that the Lomonosov and
Mendeleev Ridges were "submarine elevations that are natural components of the
continental margin." 95 If Russia is successful in its claims, then the 200 nm EEZ
outer limit would be removed, allowing Russia to extend its EEZ to 350 nm or the
end of the continental shelf.96
While Canada and Denmark have not yet submitted a claim to the
Commission on Continental Shelves, Canadian and Danish scientists claim to have
proof that the Lomonosov Ridge is actually a natural extension of the North
American continent. 97 The culminating research - the product of millions of
dollars of contributions from both governments - was presented at the 2008
International Geological Congress.98 These two countries hope that the geologic
87. Id.
88. Press Release, UN Commission on Continental Shelves, Commission on Continental Shelves
Receives its First Submission: Russian Federation First to Move to Establish Outer Limits on its
Extended Continental Shelf (12/21/2001) available at http://www.un.org/ News/Press/docs/2001
/seal729.doc.htm. Mark Benitah, Russia's Claim in the Arctic, and the Vexing Issue of Ridges in
UNCLOS, 11 A.S.I.L. 27 (2007).
89. Id.
90. Yuri Zarakhovich, Russia Claims the North Pole, TIMES, Jul. 12, 2007.
91. Id.
92. Benitah, supranote 88.
93. Id.
94. Id. See also UNCLOS supra note 7, art. 76. ("The continental margin comprises the
submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of
the shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the
subsoil thereof.").
95. Benitah, supranote 88.
96. Id.
97. Randy Boswell, Canada to Make GroundbreakingArctic Claim, NATIONAL POST, Aug. 6,
2008, available at http://www.nationalpost.com/news/canada/story.html?id=705136.
98. Id.
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research will give them grounds to support territorial claims to the Commission on
Continental Shelves. These two nations must submit their final submissions by
2013 and 2014 respectively.
Canada has been strengthening its claims of sovereignty over the continental
shelf in other ways as well. In 2002, Canada began patrolling the most remote
reaches of the Arctic with army rangers. 99 In response to Russia's symbolic
flagging of the Arctic sea floor, Canada added eight new ice-breakers to its fleet,
built a new deep-water port, reopened a closed air force base, and started a "cold
weather" army training facility. 100 The Canadian military recently launched a
satellite system that will allow surveillance of the Arctic as far as 1,000 miles
offshore.o
Bill Graham, the Canadian defense minister, exemplified the
aggressive Canadian posture when he said: "I don't see the Northwest Passage as
something for another 20 years, but at the rate of present global warming, we know
that it will be within 20 years and we have to get ahead now." 102 Canada aims to
not only tighten control of its territory, but also establish a strong posture for future
disputes over the ownership of the continental shelf and the Northwest Passage.
These widely varied country positions make it clear that more geologic
evidence must be acquired before this issue can be settled decisively. While the
Commission on Continental Shelf is in the best position to delimit boundaries, the
Commission has received dozens of pending claims from countries claiming
continental shelves all over the world. Some argue the Commission on
Continental Shelves has become overburdened with work in the past couple of
years. 103 The Commission may not be able to resolve the nature and ownership of
the Lomonososov Ridge and the area around the North Pole for some time to
come. Therefore, even though it is my belief that the Commission on Continental
Shelves would provide the best resolution to the problems of the region, Arctic
countries have incentives to scrutinize alternative methods of settling disputes.
V. WHAT Is THE LAW REGARDING STRAITS AND PASSAGES?

As mentioned previously, under the UNCLOS regime, states can exert the
most control over the waters closest to shore. This section will analyze the various
legal standards and levels of control associated with the maritime zones
immediately surrounding coastal states. This section focuses on the classification
of the maritime zone containing the Northwest Passage, because its categorization
may affect the ability of international shippers and merchants to traverse the waters
above Canada. It is important to note that the analysis to follow would not apply
to the waters above Russia. The Northern Sea Route is completely within Russian

99. Krauss et al., supranote 1.
100. Arctic Patrol Ship Purchase Met with Skepticism, CBC NEWS, Jul. 10, 2007, available at
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/07/10/north-shipreax.html.
101. Borgerson, supra note 4.
102. Krauss et al., supranote 1.
103. Nathanial Gronewold, A Peek Inside the U.N 's ContinentalShelf Commission, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2009.
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control, which is significant because many models demonstrate the Northern Sea
Route opening before the Northwest Passage does.
Each coastal zone is measured from a carefully defined baseline most often
located at the shore or low-water line. UNCLOS recognizes "internal waters" as
all waterways on the landward side of baseline. 104 These waterways basically
function as a continuation of a country's land territory. The coastal state may set
laws, regulate use, exploit resources, and maintain absolute control over internal
waters.105 UNCLOS defines "territorial waters" as the coastal area up to 12 miles
from baseline. 106 The state retains the right to set laws, regulate use, and draw on
any resource. Foreign vessels, however, have a the right of "innocent passage"
through these waters, which this means a foreign vessel can safely traverse
territorial waters but cannot fish, pollute, fire weapons, or spy. 107 "Archipelagic
waters" under the UNCLOS, are considered a hybrid of internal and territorial
waters. An archipelagic baseline can be drawn between the outermost points of the
outermost islands, so long as the points are sufficiently close to one another.108
Archipelagic waters are like internal waters in that the state can exercise full
sovereignty, but foreign vessels have right of innocent passage - similar to
territorial waters. 109
Canada has claimed sovereignty over many of the islands in the Arctic sea,
and argues that these islands create archipelagic waters under UNCLOS. 110 If
these claims are upheld, then experts believe that Canada may be able to assert
sovereignty over the Northwest Passage and thus regulate its use - which could
include the imposition of usage fees. 1 The United States disputes Canada's claim
to exclusive sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.112 The United States holds
the position that the northern islands of Canada may constitute archipelagic waters,
but contends that the Northwest Passage is actually an international strait under
UNCLOS, and thus cannot be subjected to Canada's restrictive control.
If the Northwest Passage is classified as an international strait, then ships
could freely to travel the route without Canadian control. International straits are
defined as internationally trafficked waterways that connect oceans and economic
zones through several viable routes. 1 13 While the Northwest Passage connects
oceans through numerous viable routes, Canada argues the route should fall under
its exclusive sovereignty because it has never been "internationally trafficked."1 1 4
104. UNCLOS, supranote 7, arts. 5, 8.
105. Id. art. 2.
106. Id. art. 3.
107. Id. arts. 17-19.
108. Id. art. 47.
109. Id. arts. 47-53.
110. Donald R. Rothwell, The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute: A Reassessment, 26
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 331, 332 (1993).
111. See Jarashow, Runnels, & Svenson, supra note 2, at 1600-01.
112. Rothwell, supra note 110, at 332.
113. Jarashow, Runnels, & Svenson, supra note 2, at 1605. See also UNCLOS, supra note 7, art.
37.
114. Jarashow, Runnels, & Svenson, supra note 2, at 1605-1607.
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Since 1903, when the first transit of the Northwest Passage was made, less than
fifty transits have been completed.1 15 Non-Canadian vessels made only sixteen of
these transits and few were for commercial use. 116 Even though the number of
completed transits may rise exponentially in the future, at this point Canada claims
primary usage.
The United States has not accepted Canada's efforts to
conclusively establish exclusive sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. Instead,
the United States argues the Northwest Passage should not be subject to the
exclusive sovereignty of one state. 117 However, the United States has not ratified
the Convention, thus hampering the utility of any of the potential dispute
resolution mechanisms discussed below.
VI. How

WILL ARCTIC NATIONS RESOLVE DISPUTES
SHELVES AND THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE?

OVER CONTINENTAL

International dispute resolution is controversial and tenuous. There are few
enforcement mechanisms and states are often unwilling to bind themselves to
unsavory decisions.
Nevertheless, this section will analyze various legal
frameworks within the international sphere that could be used to resolve the Arctic
disputes. UNCLOS will be addressed first, followed by the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") and the continental shelf cases that have already been decided by
this body. The Arctic Council and the rights of indigenous peoples will be
examined next and the benefits of an Arctic Treaty will be treated last. While this
aspect of the paper will focus on the more binding forms of dispute resolution, it is
worth remembering that non-binding decisions are the norm in the international
sphere. Thus, "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means" 1 8

may be a more realistic, efficient, and effective means of resolving Arctic disputes.
A. InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea
Article 83 of the UNCLOS instructs countries with opposite or adjacent
coasts that have submitted overlapping claims to the UN Commission on
Continental Shelves to agree upon a boundary. 119 If the countries cannot reach an
agreement within a "reasonable period of time," then Article 83 directs them to
resort to the remedial provisions of UNCLOS. 120 UNCLOS recognizes that
dispute resolution within the international sphere can be complex, and so the
Convention offers a variety of resolution options. UNCLOS indicates a strong
preference for peaceful resolution of disputes, and provides that countries should
first try to settle disputes informally. 12 1 If the two parties are unable to settle a
dispute on their own, UNCLOS suggests a range of forums. UNCLOS directly
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117.
118.
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sponsors the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, but also allows parties
to access the International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal. 122
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has 21 member judges. 123
Thus far, it has decided 16 cases.124 The Tribunal has jurisdiction over all disputes
submitted to it in accordance with the Convention. 125 It also extends to all matters
specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the
Tribunal. Notably, Article 298 allows nations to opt out of the binding dispute
resolution provisions for disputes that arise under Article 83.126 All Arctic nations
except Norway have exercised this option.127 This is not surprising given the
general distaste for binding dispute resolution in international law, and this fact
should not be read to undermine the effectiveness of the Tribunal. The Tribunal
could still act as an arbitral body or issue an advisory opinion, presenting a
121
valuable opportunity for compromise among Arctic nations.
B. InternationalCourt ofJustice
The International Court of Justice has decided three major overlapping
continental shelf disputes since its inception in 1946, and could act as to resolve
the current Arctic disputes over sovereignty of the Arctic sea floor and the
resources that may lie below. 129
The ICJ applied UNCLOS customary
international law provisions on continental shelves in Tunisia v. Libya1 30 and Libya
v Malta.131 The well known North Sea Continental Shelf Case1 32 was decided in
1969, before UNCLOS was drafted, but this case also dealt with similar issueS.133
However, as the ICJ noted in Libya v. Malta, even as the UNCLOS esteems a goal
of equitable solutions, it offers little guidance in achieving those solutions. 134
Because the language of the Convention is unclear, the ICJ may draw on other
international law principles-such as the equidistant principle, natural
prolongation principle, historical practice, and sector theory-to give UNCLOS
provisions context in an Arctic dispute decisions.
The equidistant principle has a strong history in customary law. Before
UNCLOS, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf provided that
continental shelf disputes for countries with opposite or adjacent coasts should be
decided by drawing a median line between the two coasts, unless the countries
122. Id. art. 287.
123. Id. Annex VI art. 2.
124. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, http://www.itlos.org/start2 en.html (last visited
Jan. 17, 2010).
125. Id.
126. UNCLOS, supranote 7, art. 298.
127. Holmes, supranote 5, at 325.
128. UNCLOS, supranote 7, art. 191
129. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 5, at 340-41.
130. Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya) 1982 I.C.J. 63 at 25-26 [hereinafter Tunis. v. Libya].
131. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 3 (June 3) [hereinafter Libya v. Malta].
132. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. Den. v. F.R.G. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 2 (Feb. 20) [hereinafter
North Sea].
133. See id.
134. Libya v. Malta at 37-39.
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came to another agreement or special circumstances required a different
arrangement. 135 This method of demarcation was used in the North Sea
ContinentalShelf Cases but rejected in Tunisia v. Libya.13 6 Originally, the method
often came under strong attack for being arbitrary because "special circumstances"
could preempt its use.137 However, the principle has grown more widely accepted
over time. An analysis based on the equidistant principle would likely favor
Canada's interests in the Arctic - at the expense of the United States. Canada
argues the Alaskan border should be demarcated as a straight continuation from the
land border on the coast. This method would allow Canada to claim a portion of
the Beaufort Sea that is predicted to be rich in natural resources.13 8
The United States argues that the Alaskan maritime border should follow the
landform in a continuous northeasterly line.13 9 This argument seems to be a
variation on the natural prolongation principle - or the principle that a nation's
maritime boundaries should reflect the 'natural prolongation' of the land territory
where reaches the coast. The meaning and application of the natural prolongation
principle has evolved over time as well. When the doctrine was first used, its
relationship to the 1958 Geneva Convention was far from clear. 140 The Court
began to expand and clarify both the equidistant principle and the natural
prolongation doctrine in Libya v. Malta.14 1 Libya argued that the natural
prolongation of the land territory into and under the sea was fundamental to the
juridical concept of the continental shelf.142 The Court, however, disagreed. This
was the first case decided after the adoption of UNCLOS, and the Court
completely set aside the relevance of natural prolongations.143 Instead, the Court
noted the significance of the 200nm exclusive economic zone described in the
access rights of the UNCLOS, and disregarded the geological or geomorphological
characteristics of the sea floor.144 Since the time of Libya v. Malta, however, the
law and practice of maritime delimitation has matured and natural prolongations
are often considered today when determining continental shelf access rights.
Countries coming before the ICJ may also try to bolster their claims with
evidence of historical use. 145 While Tunisia successfully made this argument in
Tunisia v Libya, Tunisia had an eighty year historical practice of fishing in the
contested area. 14 6 In that case, the Court noted that historical rights and the
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142. Id. at 40.
143. Colson, supranote 78, at 91.
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continental shelf are governed by distinct legal regimes. 147 As noted previously,
the Arctic has generated very little interest historically; the region has largely been
left to indigenous people who call the region home.
Various Arctic countries may also try to assert coastline proportionality, a
method of delimitation used in Libya v. Malta.148 In the Arctic, coastline
proportionality could be advanced by calling on "sector theory," a historic method
of claiming territory around the poles. Under sector theory, a country may assert
sovereignty over a pie-shaped wedge formed by extending lines of longitude from
its coast to the pole. 149 Russia and Canada have both been strong proponents of
sector theory, arguing that the ocean within each nation's sector becomes internal
waters subject to their exclusive control. 5 o The United States has historically
opposed sector theory, as Alaska represents a narrow shoreline and sector theory
tends to favor those countries with the longest coastlines. 51 This method of
demarcation does not require geologic evidence gathering from deep-sea ridges,
and will provide each Arctic country an expansion in territory.
While the ICJ has some experience dealing with continental shelf issues, nonbinding dispute resolution is the norm in the international sphere. However, even
if the parties choose to act outside the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
or the International Court of Justice, UNCLOS would still probably apply.
UNCLOS has gained almost universal ratification, and those countries that remain
as hold-outs recognize the Convention as a codification of customary international
law. Thus, an international arbitral tribunal or mediator would almost certainly use
UNCLOS if the Arctic nations chose a non-binding resolution process.
C. Arctic Council
The Arctic Council is another forum that could offer resolution to Arctic
territorial disputes. The Ottawa Declaration formally established the Arctic
Council in 1996 as an international body designed to deal with problems in the
region, but currently it only addresses issues of sustainable development and
environmental protection. 152 Part of the reason for its silence on the most pressing
concerns is a 1996 prohibition made by the United States that prevents the group
from addressing security concerns, a prohibition that has thus far prevented the
Arctic Council from addressing territorial demarcation of the region.153 If the
charter were reconstructed, however, the Arctic Council might prove a powerful
tool in the creation of a new standard for the Arctic region. One of the major
advantages of utilizing this international group is the consideration the Arctic
Council already gives to the indigenous people of the region - including the
Aleuts, Inuits, and Saami. 15 4 The Arctic has a population of over four million
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
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154.

Id.
Holmes, supranote 5, at 345.
Id.
Colson, supranote 78, at 97.
Id.
About Arctic Council, http://arctic-council.org/article/about (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
Borgerson, supra note 4.
About Arctic Council, supranote 152.

544

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:3

people, including more than thirty different indigenous groups.15 5 The people who
currently live in the Arctic and have roots going back centuries deserve to have
their opinions incorporated into future decisions. If indigenous people have a
voice in the decision-making process, then they will be more likely to support
policies and aid scientists with their ability to detect early or unnoticed impacts of
climate change. 156 Thus, the concerns of indigenous people should be considered
in any attempted resolution, whether through the Arctic Council or otherwise.
D. Arctic Treaty
The conflicts surrounding arctic resources and sea routes could also be
resolved through treaty. A treaty could adjudicate sovereignty, postpone territorial
disputes, and foster cooperation amongst signatories. One option is a limited treaty
involving the North American countries. The other option is an expansive treaty
involving all Arctic nations. In the wake of the aggressive Russian maneuvering
that took place in 2007, some called for the United States, Canada, and
Denmark/Greenland to enter into a limited trilateral treaty that would exercise joint
jurisdiction over any potential North American Arctic shipping. 157 This treaty
could be designed to counteract Russian control over the region, and would allow
the free passage of vessels from the United States through the Northwest Passage.
A treaty such as this could enact a policy that would allow countries to share
responsibility for policing the Arctic waters as well as protecting the fragile Arctic
environment. 1'
Specific provisions within the treaty could be used to
administrate the division of resources such as oil and natural gas. Moreover, a
treaty of this kind would offset or even stop Russian expansionism and afford
Canada and Greenland protection under the United States' military. However, a

limited treaty such as this would contain drawbacks. Excluding Russia would
leave measure of oversight for Russian use of the Arctic. Therefore, most experts
advocate a multilateral treaty among all Arctic nations rather than the more limited
trilateral treaty.
Multilateral treaties have already proved to be an effective way of resolving
territorial disputes similar to the Arctic controversy. For 50 years, the 1959
Antarctic Treaty has regulated the sovereignty disagreements that previously
plagued the southern polar region and has preserved the region as a global
commons area. 159 The success of the Antarctic Treaty is often attributed to its
expansive membership. The Antarctic Treaty quickly became a legitimate
document because twelve major powers ratified it immediately after its creation. 160
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Since its inception, more than 40 states have ratified the Antarctic treaty, thus
cementing its goal of promoting peace and science.
The Arctic and the Antarctic nations share four common goals: continued
scientific investigation, preservation of territorial sovereignty, national security,
and environmental protection. 16 1 In Antarctica, these goals have been achieved
through the unique provisions of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.162 Article IV
suspended all territorial rights to the Antarctic, but also stated that signing the
Treaty did not represent "a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of
any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica." 163 Part 2 of Article IV
also states no country may make new claims of territorial sovereignty while the
treaty is in force. 164 The treaty has been successful because no party has been
allowed to advance their claims, but at the same time no party has been forced to
renounce their claims.
Article IV has undoubtedly been essential to the Antarctic Treaty, and if an
Arctic Treaty were created, the decision to include a similar clause would be a
major and controversial choice. While the suspension of territorial rights in the
Arctic may protect the environment, the countries in the region may hesitate to
give up their claims on hydrocarbon fuels. Some critics argue the differences
between the Arctic and Antarctic outnumber the similarities, and thus the Antarctic
Treaty is an imperfect guide. Not only does the Antarctic lack the promise of
readily accessible hydrocarbon resources, but the southern polar reaches are also
removed from valuable trade routes and are far from any other continent. 165
Furthermore, the Arctic is an ocean while the Antarctic is a continent. The
solutions that allowed the peaceful division of land may not be as successful in
oceanic disputes over valuable waters.
While there are undeniable differences between the Arctic and the Antarctic,
they are similar in that they are both fragile ecosystems needing protection.
Moreover, the fact that the Arctic is closer to trade routes and continents means
that it is even more subject to dispute and clearly designated ownership is all the
more essential.
Undoubtedly, Arctic nations will have a difficult time
compromising, and it is possible that 'soft law' provisions may be the best way to
reach a compromise. Any decision made must not only balance the competing
sovereignty claims, but also assess long term environmental concerns as well.
CONCLUSION

The United States' persistent refusal to ratify UNCLOS is somewhat
surprising because the Convention's negotiations concluded in 1982 and every
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other major industrialized country has ratified it. 166 Presumably, the United States'
position is rooted in the negotiation of the Convention that took place in the
1970's. At that time, the UN proposed arrangements for the sharing of technical
mining information with a new International Seabed Authority.167 The United
States - a leader in the development of the technologies necessary for deep sea
mining - was unwilling to divulge its practices, and thus refused to sign the
Convention. 168 Even though the provision was dropped in 1994, the United States
has yet to endorse UNCLOS despite numerous calls for the ratification from within
the country and abroad. 169 It appears that a few U.S. Senators remain the last
holdouts of resistance to the Convention - blocking its ratification.
Can UNCLOS be considered a powerful international agreement if the United
States has not ratified it? Legitimacy relies on the internalization of external
standards to substantiate the belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be
obeyed. In the international sphere, very few laws or organizations have obtained
recognition and approval of all countries. Because so few bodies govern the
relations between states, any breach to the legitimacy of those bodies is clearly
significant. Despite the destabilizing effect of the United States' non-ratification
of the UNCLOS, 157 countries and the European Community have joined in the
Convention.1 7 0
Moreover, in many areas, UNCLOS codifies preexisting
customary international law of the sea that the United States already recognizes.171
Therefore, while non-ratification may weaken the UNCLOS, at the moment, it
appears the rest of the world accepts the Convention as legitimate. UNCLOS will
play an essential role in resolving disagreements in the Arctic, and it is critical for
the United States ratify UNCLOS in the very near future.
This paper began with an explanation of climate change and Arctic ice melt
because predictions about future developments in the region rely on a basic
understanding of these forces. As the ice melts, the Northwest Passage and the
Northern Sea Route will become viable routes for summer shipping - opening the
region to a new reality. Merchants as well as politicians are calculating the
dangers as well as the potential cost reductions associated with northern shipping
routes. As the technology and infrastructure develop in the Arctic, it may become
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possible to utilize the region's rich natural resources. It is this prospect that has
generated the most excitement among Arctic nations and precipitates the need for
an effective legal regime in the area. It is my belief that UNCLOS and the
Commission on Continental Shelves can provide the legal mechanisms necessary
to delineate sovereignty over the continental shelves and ownership of the
resources that may be discovered there. UNCLOS will inform the debates about
the Northwest Passage; implicating the future of international trade. Finally, any
dispute resolution in the Arctic would likely either involve a UNCLOS body, such
as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or an application of UNCLOS
principles. The United States' non-ratification of the Convention acts as a major
roadblock to advancing its national interests and settling the controversies in the
region.
While it is probably already too late to prevent the Arctic ice melt, it is not too
late to effectively resolve the sovereignty issues the melt will create. Thus far, the
United States has not taken a significant role in the conflict or its resolution, but
this type of ambivalence cannot continue as disputes escalate. Many suggest the
United States join and support multilateral efforts that have already been
established. Dispute resolution will be certainly be complicated and controversial;
therefore, the full participation and engagement of all Arctic nations will be
necessary. A geographical transformation of this magnitude has never occurred in
the course of modem human history, and never has a physical change in landscape
freed so many natural resources or created such new potential for trade. Therefore,
it is essential that an adequate framework be developed to deal with these radical
changes, and it is obvious that the framework needs not only the cooperation, but
also the leadership of the United States.

